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daughter, eighteen, attending University of Illinois in art
school, and son, Larry, fifteen. Home address: 6623 N. Kil­
patrick Ave., Lincolnwood, Ill. Office: 8999 Palmer St., River
Grove, Ill.
WOLFSON, LEo.-Partner, C. J. Wolfson & Co. Formerly
associated with law firm now known as Levinson, Becker &
Peebles, 1930-42, at which time left practice of law to be
associated with present business. Former president, Men's
Club of Beth Am; former president, Men's Apparel Club
of Indiana. Former vice-president, National Association of
Men's Apparel Clubs. Married to Janet Harris, Ph.B. Uni­
versity of Chicago, 1932. Has two sons, ages twelve and
sixteen. Home address: 7733 Luella Ave., Chicago 49. Office:
307 W. Van Buren St., Chicago 7.
Addendum
Well, that's it for the first twenty-five! It might sim­
plify procedures if you would let the Law School know
from time to time what you are doing for the next
twenty-five. This brings to mind the fact that, after the
above success story, the School might think it exaggerated
unless some healthy contributions are forthcoming from
everyone of you. The Law School has made great
strides. Those of you who are in touch know that there
truly are a new set of "greats" training the minds of the
future. The School has outgrown its physical capacity. It
needs your help and deserves your support.
To all of you the best of everything to be wished for.
To those of you who have taken the trouble to fill out
your questionnaire, it has been a real pleasure to hear
from you; it is a genuine loss to the School not to have
heard from the others. Looking ahead to our fiftieth,
however, it is hoped that another classmate will groom
himself to further this adulatory saga of the Class of '30.
Corporation Law-
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case of Gray v. Portland Bank. Why in this respect Eng­
land should have rejected an obvious partnership analogy
I cannot explain; but, when I review the difficulties that
the strict rule has caused in America, I cannot but think
that we were wise to do so.
Again, the American courts have adopted the partner­
ship analogy as regards the stockholders' rights to in­
spect the corporate books and records. The English courts
have rejected it, holding that a stockholder as such has
no right to inspect the financial records. It is perhaps
doubtful whether in practice this puts the American
stockholder in a much stronger position than his Eng­
lish confrere. Reports suggest that in many (perhaps
most) cases his rights will not be recognized by the
corporation without a lawsuit. Without this he may
even be denied access to the list of stockholders-some­
thing that he could always obtain in England. Still, in
the absence of statutory regulation, he clearly has greater
legal rights-rights which may be a source of grave
embarrassment to the company. Rightly or wrongly,
English law has in this respect treated the stockholder as
a creditor rather than a partner.
I turn now to a consideration of the two matters
which I have previously described as the vital corporate
problems of this century: the protection of purchasers
of securities and the control of stockholders over man­
agement. Both are, of course, aspects of the generic prob­
lem of investor protection.
On the first aspect I do not propose to say much. Both
our countries (at least if most of your state "blue-sky
laws" be disregarded) have relied in the main on the
same philosophy-that of disclosure. Both have provided
sanctions, civil and criminal, for misstatements or mate­
rial omissions which supplement and indeed reverse the
strict common-law fraud principles. But ex post facto
sanctions are far less effective than initial scrutiny of the
prospectus to insure its accuracy and completeness. In
America this vital task of initial screening has been in­
trusted to government agencies-the Securities and Ex­
change Commission-in cases to which the Securities
Act applies. It is here that English law appears extraor­
dinarily lax to the American observer. The Companies
Act requires registration at the Companies Registry of
the prospectus and prescribes its contents. But neither
the Registry nor anyone else is given the task of pre­
liminary investigation to insure the accuracy of the
information disclosed, and until 1948 there was not even
a mandatory "waiting period." The explanation of this
apparent anomaly is found in the different and infinitely
simpler organization of the securities industry in Eng­
land. The over-the-counter market scarcely exists, and
in practice no public offering can be made without ob­
taining a quotation for the shares on one of the recog­
nized stock exchanges, normally London. These stock
exchanges have their own rules which in many respects
are far more stringent than those of the act and which
require the publication of the prospectus in the national
press where it will be commented on and criticized by
the financial columnists. The issue must be sponsored
by members of the Exchange and, in practice, will be
undertaken and underwritten by one of a small number
of issuing houses ("investment bankers," as you call
them) of high repute. To protect their own reputations
and to preserve their freedom from possible legal sanc­
tions, these brokers, dealers, and issuing houses subject
the issues which they back to the most stringent scrutiny.
This scrutiny, moreover, transcends investigation merely
of accuracy-the sponsor.s will want to insure that the
issue is sound financially as well as legally. In other
words, we, with our simpler and more unified organiza­
tion, have been able to leave the vital task of screening to
private enterprise instead of to public authorities. That
this system works pretty well is, I think, shown by the
fact that in recent years there have been only a handful
of criminal prosecutions arising out of misleading pro-
